Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Randy Krantz v. Kathy Holt : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Wendell E. Bennett; Attorney for Appellee.
Ronald C. Barker, Mitchell R. Barker; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Krantz v. Holt, No. 900181.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2968

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ww.

DOCUMENT
KFU

45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.1.

HI.ITIU.

WV>UfAIj

BRIEF,

3mi<&\
IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH

RANDY KRANTZ,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff and Appellant^
vs.
KATHY HOLT,

Docket No. 900181
District Case No. 40041
Classification 16

Defendant and Appellee.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT,
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY PRESIDING
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Mitchell R. Barker, # 4530
Attorneys for Appellant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 486-9636
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Appellee
448 East 400 South, Suite # 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

55E

0CI v

T ^ ^

1990

IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH

RANDY KRANTZ,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
KATHY HOLT,

Docket No. 900181
District Case No. 40041
Classification 16

Defendant and Appellee.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT,
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY PRESIDING
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Mitchell R. Barker, # 4530
Attorneys for Appellant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 486-9636
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Appellee
448 East 400 South, Suite # 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
- 1 -

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

i.

Cases

ii.

Statutes and Rules

3
•

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

4

1.

Holt has conceded several of Krantz's points

2.

Several legal arguments are also not opposed,

4

and may be deemed conceded

4

3.

There remain factual disputes

5

4.

Holt cannot overcome her hearsay problem

6

5.

Consideration was the purchase and sale
of the home
7
Holt confuses "failure of consideration" with
"lack of consideration."
8
"Failure" and "lack" of consideration are not the

6.
I.

same thing

9

8.

There is sufficient consideration

10

9.

The check was not properly presented

10

10. The parties1 modification is valid

•

12

II.

The Statute of Frauds is not violated

13

12.

Holt has not shown that Williams applies

14

13.

Timeliness of the ex-husband's approval is,
at best, a factual issue
Performance takes the agreement outside the
statute of frauds, if it applied
- 2 -

14.

15
15

15.

Closing the sale the day after the stated date
does not excuse performance

16

CONCLUSION

17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

18

Table of Authorities
i.

Cases

Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 964, 13
Utah 2d 177 (1962)
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d 284, 106
Utah 166 (1944)

13
12

Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah App.
1988)

9,10

Gasser v. Home, 557 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1976)
General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976)
Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah 1980)
State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957)
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 432 (Utah 1986)
Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (1975)

10
9
16
6
14,15
16

Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (1975)....6
ii.

Statutes and Rules

Utah Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-1, Utah Code (1989);

14,16

§ 25-5-8, Utah Code (1943)

16

Utah Uniform Commercial Code, § 70A-3-504(1), Utah
Code (1965)
- 3 -

13

Utah Uniform Commercial Code, § 70A-3-504(2)(c), Utah
Code (1965)

13

Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c)

6

Utah Rules of Evidence 802

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Holt has failed to demonstrate an absence of genuine
factual disputes. The judge may not granted summary judgment as
a result of having weighed the evidence.
Since Holt's ex-husband no longer owned the property/
neither law nor the contract required his written approval.
ARGUMENT
1. Holt has conceded several of Krantz's points. These
include the following facts, admitted either expressly or by
failure to respond:
a. The $500 check was not deposited, and was not
presented at the branch where Krantz banks.
b. The parties agreed to include the $500 in the payment
at closing.
c. Holt's ex-husband no longer had any interest in the
home.
d. Holt's ex-husband approved the sale orally.
e. The parties agreed to a closing date one day later
than the date contemplated by the earnest money agreement.
f.

Krantz deposited the purchase price the morning of

the agreed closing date.

2.

Several legal arguments are also not opposed, and may

be deemed conceded.

They include (with citations to the page in

Krantz's brief where they are discussed):

- 4 -

g.
resolved

That

the benefit of all factual doubts must be

in favor of Krantz, since the dismissal was on a

summary judgment motion.
h.

That

the

App. Br. p. 14.

trial

court

relied

upon

hearsay to find the check was "dishonored."

inadmissible

App. Br. p. 16.

Holt has not even attempted to point to a hearsay exception.
See Resp. Br.
i.

The (disputed) problem with the $500 check does not

constitute a "substantial" failure of performance.

App. Br. p.

19, quoting Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321
(Utah 1975).
j.

The primary consideration was the purchase price, not

the $500 earnest money.
k.

Holt's

App. Br. p. 20.

ex-husband

could

not

have

enforced

any

agreement to sell the property, since his interest had long
since been awarded to Holt in a divorce.
1.

App. Br. p. 26.

Krantz performed his obligations under the contract.

App. Br. pp. 27-28.
m.

The Statute of Frauds does not apply in the event of

part performance.

3.

There

remain

factual

disputes.

This

is

made

especially clear by the fact that much of the briefing has been
consumed

by

arguing

whether

or

- 5 -

not

the

$500

check

was

dishonored.

Further, the parties hotly dispute whether Holt's

former husband held any conveyable
execution

of

the

earnest

money

interest at the time of

contract, necessitating

his

signature absent part performance.

4.
judge's

Holt
ruling

cannot overcome her hearsay problem.
is expressly

based

The

in large measure upon a

finding that the check was dishonored. That finding stems from
Holt's

representation

that

someone

from

the bank

told her

Krantz's check would not clear on certain dates.
If she had actually deposited the check, she might have
gained personal knowledge of whether it was dishonored.

As it

stands, she must point only to blatant hearsay, offered to prove
her version of the truth of the matter: that there was not
enough money in the Krantz account.

Utah Rules of Ev. 801(c).

A primary reason hearsay is not admissible is that the
declarant

is not available for cross examination.

State v.

Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957), interpreting Utah
Rules of Ev. 802.

Here the bank employee is not available, nor

even identified.
Good sense indicates that it is especially inappropriate
to resolve with hearsay the key issue in a summary judgment
decision, rendered without a full fleshing out of the facts. It
must be borne in mind that the issue around which the hearsay
- 6 -

revolves

(whether

controversy/

the check was dishonored) is an issue of

both factually and legally.

This was pointed out

in Krantz's opening brief (Br. pp. 14-15), and was not really
disputed by Holt.

5.
Here

Consideration was the purchase and sale of the home.

again,

Krantz's

opening

brief

pointed

out

that

the

consideration for the contract was the entire purchase price of
the home.

Br. p. 20.

Rather than meeting that assertion head

on, Holt simply states, as she did to the trial court, "The
consideration required to support the earnest money agreement in
this case

is written

in the contract: the payment of Five

Hundred Dollars ($500.00) by Krantz to Holt."
6-7.

Response Br. p.

This approach ignores the subject transaction and meaning

of the parties1 contract.
Holt

is correct

in stating that the consideration is

"written in the contract."

But it is far from clear why she

feels free to excise and only consider the $500.

The only

portions of the contract to which she could be referring to read
as follows:
The undersigned Buyer Randy Krantz hereby
deposits with Brokerage EARNEST MONEY in the amount
of Five Hundred & no/100 Dollars ($500.00) in the
form of personal check which shall be deposited in
accordance with applicable State Law.

- 7 -

2.
PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING,
The total
purchase price for the property is Twenty Seven
Thousand & no/100 dollars ($27,000,00) which shall
be paid as follows:
$500
which
represents the aforedescribed
EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT
$26500,00 representing the approximate balance of
CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.

t$27,000,00 I TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE
Earnest Money

Sales Agreement, 8-1-86, p. 2, Appendix

E to

Krantz Brief, Exhibit A to Response Brief (emphasis in original;
underlining

indicative

of

hand

written

fill

in

the

blank

entries).
Holt may not unilaterally declare the smallest portion of
the purchase price, the $500 earnest money "deposit", to be
"the" consideration.

She especially may not assert (as she must

on summary judgment) that it is undisputed that the lower amount
is the sole consideration.

6.

Holt confuses "failure of consideration" with "lack

of consideration."

The order which she asks this Court uphold

gives

its

as

one

of

grounds

for

dismissal

"failure

of

consideration tendered in the form of a personal check, which
was dishonored. . . . "
Summary

Judgment

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for

and Denying

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment, R. 196-97, Appendix C to Opening Br., p. 2.
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Since failure of consideration was a stated basis for the
trial court's dismissal (and failure of consideration was not),
Krantz argued that there was no such failure.
18-19.

In

response, Holt

ignored

instead upon "lack" of consideration.

Opening Br. p.

that argument

and dwelt

Yet Holt's same Response

Brief still states that the first issue is whether the trial
court properly granted summary judgment "based on failure of
consideration. . . ."

Br. p. 1 (unnumbered)(emphasis added).

This midstream switch should not be tolerated/ and only
serves to confuse the issues.

Krantz cited as error the trial

court's holding, not what Holt believes the judge could have
held.

For Holt to establish (and the trial court to find) lack

of consideration, this Court would have to remand the matter for
trial.

See, Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 632, n.

4 (Utah App. 1988) (there is a presumption that written contract
is supported by consideration, and "when evidence tending to
prove lack of consideration

is introduced, the issue .

becomes a question of fact for the trier of fact"}.

Krantz

requests such a remand.

7.

"Failure" and "lack" of consideration are not the

same thing.
There
is
a
distinction
between
lack
of
consideration and failure of consideration. Where
consideration is lacking, there can be no contract.
Where consideration fails, there was a contract
when the agreement was made, but because of some
- 9 -

supervening cause, the promised performance fails.
General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d
502, 504-505 (Utah 1976); cited with approval, Dementas, supra,
764 P.2d at 632, n. 4.

It is too late now for Holt to elect a

new theory to support a previously granted summary judgment
motion.

8.

There is sufficient consideration.

[This issue,

introduced by Holt for the first time on appeal,

is treated in

the

event

the

Court

considers

her

argument.]

There

is

consideration "whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where a
promisee suffers a detriment, however slight."

Dementas, supra,

764 P.2d at 632, quoting Gasser v. Home, 557 P.2d 154, 155
(Utah 1976).
Under the above standard, surely even a promise to pay
$500,

either

consideration.

currently

or

at

closing, would

be

sufficient

Without question the $27,000 purchase price, the

real consideration, is adequate.

9.

The check was not properly presented.

On this issue

Holt virtually admits that there remain factual issues, when she
states:
Krantz claims that the check was never formally
presented to the bank. He also claims that between
the date the check was issued, August 1, 1986, and
the date he closed the contract, August 21, 1986,
there were only a few days that his account did not
- 10 -

contain sufficient funds to cover the check.
(Krantz depo. p. 42-44).
Krantz further claims
that if Holt had presented the check to his own
branch or deposited it, the check would have
cleared. (Krantz depo. p. 44, 1. 21).
Response Br. p. 7.
The statute sets forth the definition of "presentment".
§ 70A-3-504(l)(1965) ("demand for acceptance or payment").

But

Holt

She

misinterprets

the

way

presentment

must

occur.

correctly cites to subparagraph (2) of the above section, but
then disregards its plain meaning.
(2)

Presentment may be made
(a) at the place of acceptance or payment
specified in the instrument or if there be none at
the place ot business or residence of the party to
accept or pay.
§ 70A-3-504(2)(c)

(1965)

(emphasis added).

Amazingly, Holt

follows a quotation of that statute with, "Therefore it was
Holt's option to cash the check at the Bountiful branch of
Commercial

Security

Bank, which was

in the city where she

resided, and not at Krantzfs branch . . . ." Br. p. 8 (emphasis
added).
Of course the statute makes it clear that the place of
residence of Krantz (the payor) or his bank branch is the proper
place of presentment, not a Bountiful branch of that bank.
place "specified in the instrument" in this case is
"FOURTH SOUTH OFFICE Commercial Security Bank
519 E. 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
- 11 -

The

Check # 4751# Exhibit B to Response Brief.
presentment was not made.
Holt,

who

neither

Obviously, proper

To support what the trial court did,

deposited

the

check

for

acceptance

nor

presented it at the drawee branch for payment, must demonstrate
that there is no factual dispute over

whether there was proper

consideration and whether the check was "dishonored".

10.

The parties' modification is valid.

If Holt wishes

to dispute that she asked Krantz to simply include the $500 with
the payment to be made at closing, there remains an issue of
fact

for

trial.

authority)

that

She is mistaken when she states
"if

a

written

contract

modification must also be in writing."
v. Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d

is

(without

modified,

Br. p. 9.

the

See, Calhoun

284, 106 Utah 166

(1944)

(parties usually may orally modify written contract).
More

importantly,

Holt's

request

that

the

$500

be

included in the purchase price at closing is a waiver of strict
compliance

with

the

existing

contract,

requiring consideration or a writing.

not

a

modification

Krantz offered to replace

the check when Holt claimed to have had trouble cashing it.
Krantz depo. p. 46, 1. 2 to 12; Holt depo. p. 22, 1. 2 to 12,
quoted at pp. 17-18, Opening Br.

Holt declined

(Id.).

She

requested that Krantz just include it at closing, operating as a
waiver of any other form or time of payment she might have
otherwise been able

to enforce.
- 12 -

Instead of arranging for the check to clear (or paying
cash), Krantz waiting and deposited the money at closing.

Where

a party misleads the other into believing strict performance of
the contract is unnecessary/ she may not suddenly reverse her
position and demand strict performance in order to avoid going
through with the agreed upon transaction.

Caldwell v* Anschutz

Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 964, 13 Utah 2d 177 (1962).
At a minimum, it is clear from the above that there were
not sufficient undisputed facts from which the court could have
made

any

"finding" about whether

the check was dishonored,

whether Holt waived strict performance and whether the disputed
check problem somehow excused closing the contract.

11.

The Statute of Frauds was not violated.

demonstrated

in Krantz's

Opening Brief.

argument need not be repeated at length.
reckless

with

her

reference

to

her

This was

pp. 21-28.

That

But because Holt is

"husband",

it must be

emphasized that at all times relevant to this case they were
divorced.

Long before the earnest money agreement was signed,

the divorce decree awarded that house in its entirety to Holt.
As owner of the property, she had the right to contract
for its conveyance.

Mr. Holt could have conveyed nothing.

If

Mr. Holt's name appeared on the title, it was merely a title
defect Mrs. Holt was required to clear up by closing, or risk
- 13 -

being in breach.

See, Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, H 3,

Opening Br. Appendix E, Response Br. Exhibit A.
Holt continually refers to her then ex-husband as "joint
owner", without arguing why he so qualifies.

She begs the

question by arguing that a joint owner must sign a contract to
convey his land.

Response Br. pp 10-14.

The statute of frauds only limits the ability to grant an
interest in real property.

§ 25-5-1, Utah Code (1989).

It has

no application to a contract requiring oral approval for the
true owner to convey her interest.
Since he is not a co-owner, the contract and not the
statute of frauds determines whether Mr. Holt's approval had to
be written.

It merely stated, "Offer subject to approval of

Stephen Holt by 8-4-86".

Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, K 3,

Opening Br. Appendix E, Response Br. Exhibit A, 11 7.

12.

Holt has not shown that her leading case applies.

Appellant's

Opening

Brief

demonstrates

that

Williams

Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), does not apply.
24-26.

Without

establishing

what

disposing
made

of

Holt's

those
former

arguments,
husband

v.

Br. pp.
or

an owner

even
for

statute of frauds purposes, Holt simply undertakes to argue the
case.

Response Br. pp. 11-13.

If Holt wishes to have her

ex-husband treated as an owner, she must have adduced unaisputed
- 14 -

evidence to that effect in the trial court.
she conceded

Rather than do so,

Krantz's evidence that Mr. Holt's rights were

terminated by the divorce decree.
The simple fact is that the Williams spouses were still
married and still joint tenants.
jointly owned the land.
his

prior

Krantz incorporates by reference all

arguments

on

distinguishability of Williams.

13.

Here, the divorcees no longer

the

inapplicability

Id.

Timeliness of the ex-husband's approval is, at best,

a factual issue.

The contract provides that the approval should

be by August 4, 1986.

Holt testified that he did approve,

"approximately one week after the earnest money."
10.

and

Holt depo. p.

Amazingly, Holt turns this "approximately one week" into a

supposedly undisputed fact: that the admitted approval by Holt's
husband was not timely.
Of

coursed

Holt

ignores

her

own

waiver

of

strict

performance under the contract, and the fact that the time is of
the essence clause only comes into effect 30 days after closing.
Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, % 3, Opening Br. Appendix E,
Response Br. Exhibit A, 11 Q.

14.

Performance clearly takes the agreement outside the

statute of frauds, if that statute ever applied.
- 15 -

This was

pointed out at length in Krantz's opening brief*

Br. pp. 26-28.

And six instances of part performance were set forth.
27-28.

Id. at p.

Yet Holt's only response is to state that the part

performance

usually

benefits

the

seller, and

Holt was not

benefited.

She cites to no authority for that unique standard

for part performance.
Certainly the statute on part performance alludes to no
such

requirement.

§ 25-5-8,

Utah

Code

(1907).

Holt has

suggested no reason to interpret the statute contrary to its
plain language,

which makes a straight-forward exclusion from

the statute of frauds "in

case of part performance . . • .n

Id.
The elements of part performance in instances like this
are set forth in Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 56 (Utah 1980).
Conferring some benefit on the other party is not mentioned as
an element.

The same is true in Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d

1035, 1038 (Utah 1975) (oral contract by joint tenant spouses
upheld due to substantial part performance).

15.

Closing the sale the day after the contract's stated

date does not excuse performance•

There is no evidence that

this closing date, requested by Holt herself and reconfirmed
that very day, was a condition to enforcement of the contract.
Even the trial judge held that the untimely closing argument was
- 16 -

not sufficient of itself to excuse performance.

Order Granting

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 196-97, Appendix C to Opening
Br., p. 2.
remorse.

It was merely an afterthought and excuse for buyer's
The evidence needed to prove otherwise has not been

propounded.
The "time is of the essence" clause was not effective
under the circumstances where (a) 30 days after closing had not
passed (only one day had), (b) Holt had chosen the date, waiving
her right to complain about it, and (c) Krantz had relied upon
her

date

selection

in

not

closing

sooner.

Under

those

conditions Holt is estopped to take advantage of the technical
variation from the contract which she herself arranged.

See,

Earnest Money Agreement, p. 3, 11 3, Opening Br. Appendix E,
Response Br. Exhibit A, 11 Q (acts of God may extend closing by
seven days, "but in no event more than thirty (30) dctys beyond
the closing date provided herein.
essence."}

Thereafter, time is of the

Id. (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION
The Court improperly weighed the evidence, and made a
factual

finding

that

Krantz's

check

was

dishonored.

This

finding is particularly erroneous, since it was based on rank
hearsay.

Had the check been properly presented, it would have

cleared.
- 17 -

Holt waived her rights to strictly enforce the contract,
including the closing date and the manner in which the $500
earnest money would be paid.
did not

fail.

Consideration was not lacking and

There is no statute of frauds problem, since the

only person with an interest to convey (Holt) signed, and since
part performance makes the statute inapplicable.
Krantz requests that the Court reverse and remand this
case, with instructions to hear the case on the merits or to
grant summary judgment in favor of Krantz.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 1990.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
Attorneys for Apellant Krantz
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^th day of October, 1990, I
caused an original and nine copies of the foregoing brief to be
filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court and caused four copies
to be served, by postage prepaid mail or hand delivery on the
same date, to:
Wendell E. Bennett, Esq.
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mitchell R. Barker
- 18 -

